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A B S T R A C TProgram transformation is widely used for producing correct mutations of a given program so as to satisfy the
user’s intent that can be expressed by means of some sort of specification (e.g. logical assertions, functional
specifications, reference implementations, summaries, examples). This paper describes an automated correction
methodology for Maude programs that is based on program transformation and can be used to enforce a safety
policy, given by a set A of system assertions, in a Maude program R that might disprove some of the assertions. The
outcome of the technique is a safe program refinement R' of R in which every computation is a good run, i.e., it
satisfies the assertions in A. Furthermore, the transformation ensures that no good run of R is removed from R'.
Advantages of this correction methodology can be summarized as follows.
 A fully automatic program transformation featuring both program diagnosis and repair that preserves all
executability requirements.
 A simple logical notation to declaratively express invariant properties and other safety constraints through
assertions.
 No dynamic information is required to infer program fixes: the methodology is static and does not need to
collect any error symptom at runtime.ht
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Short introduction regarding the method applicability and motivation
This paper describes an automated correction methodology that can be applied to impose safety
properties on concurrent and nondeterministic software systems that are modelled as Maude
programs. Nonetheless, the core idea of our correction transformation can be transferred to virtually
any rewriting-based programming language, from simple term rewriting systems and rule-based
languages such as CafeOBJ, OBJ, ASF + SDF, and ELAN, to widespread functional languages such as
Haskell and Erlang, provided that the transformation preserves the executability conditions required
by the language. Indeed, the proposed correction method transforms program rules into guarded
program rules whose conditions supersede the (external) safety assertion checks and are simply
evaluated by using the very same rewriting infrastructure of the language. Therefore, the provided
assertion checking mechanism can be embedded into any setting that supports rewriting with an
effort that depends on the complexity of the chosen formal framework.
In the following, we outline the correction procedure for repairing Maude programs with respect to
a safety policy that is expressed as a set of system assertions; a similar modus operandi can be
followed to replicate this method in different rewriting frameworks such as those mentioned above.
The advantage of the technique is that more refined versions of a program can be incrementally built
without any programming effort by simply adding new safety constraints into the set of assertions.
This makes it possible to adapt existing Maude programs to predefined safety policies and allows the
inexperienced user to largely forget about Maude syntax and semantics. An infographic that outlines
the basic steps of the correction methodology is given in Fig. 1.
On the rewrite framework
Maude [2] is a high-performance language and system that efficiently implements Rewriting Logic
[4], which is a logic of change that seamlessly unifies a wide variety of models of concurrency. A Maude
program R is essentially made up of two components, E and R, where E is a canonical (membership) equational theory that models system states as terms of an algebraic
data type, and R is a set of rewrite rules that define transitions between states and which is assumed to be coherent
w.r.t. the equations in the set E.
Canonicity of E and coherence between R and E are fundamental executability properties that
guarantee the soundness and completeness of Maude’s evaluation mechanism [3].
Algebraic structures often involve axioms like associativity, commutativity, and/or identity (also
known as unity) of function symbols, which cannot be handled by ordinary term rewriting but instead
are handled implicitly by working with congruence classes of terms. More precisely, the membership
equational theory E is decomposed into a disjoint union E = D [ Ax, where
Fig. 1. Basic correction procedure.
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terms) and equations that are implicitly oriented from left to right as rewrite rules (and
operationally used as simplification rules), and Ax is a set of algebraic axioms that are implicitly expressed as function attributes and are mainly
used for Ax-matching.
The system evolves by rewriting states using equational rewriting, i.e., rewriting with the rewrite
rules in R modulo the equations and axioms in E. For the sake of simplicity, we only consider topmost
Maude programs, that is, Maude programs in which rewrites can only happen at the state top level
position. This implies that no local state changes are allowed: in other words, each rewrite step
completely replace a state s1 with a new term representing the derived state s2. In [1], increasingly
involved Maude program structures are considered (such as topmost modulo Ax rewrite theories and
Russian doll theories that support system states with recursively nested structures).
In our framework, system safety properties are specified by means of assertions, that is, logical
statements of the form S | f, where S is a term (the state template) and f is a quantifier-free, first-order
logic formula (the state invariant). An assertion S | f holds in a system state s iff, for every subterm of s
that matches (modulo E) the algebraic structure of the state template S with substitution s, the
constraints given by the instantiated formula ws are satisfied. In our scenario, the notion of satisfaction
of a (closed) instance ws of w boils down to reducing ws to its truth value via equational rewriting. If an
assertion does not hold in a system state s, we say that there is an assertion violation in s.
Maude's formal tools are numerous and perform different analysis and verification tasks, either
statically (e.g., Maude's theorem prover and model checker) or dynamically (Maude's assertion
checker); see [1] for references. However, to the best of our knowledge, there is no previous
methodology for automated safety enforcement in Maude.
The proposed method
Our correction method is based on a two-phase program transformation technique that allows a
Maude program R to be refined into a program R' w.r.t. a set of assertions A as follows. Let us assume
that the program R consists of the equation set E and the rewrite rule set R.1 The first phase translates the assertion set A into an executable equational definition Eq(A) that can
be used to detect assertion violations within system states. Roughly speaking, given a system state s,
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simplified into the special constant fail by using the equational theory E of R extended with Eq(A).
Specifically, each assertion (S | f) is encoded by a conditional equation in Eq(A) of the form
such that _ S’ is a renamed apart version of the state template S where each operator f in S has been replaced by a
new operator f’3 ; fail is a fresh new constant that does not occur in R;
 ori(t’) is a function that takes a renamed apart term t’ and restores its original version t, that is,
ori(t’) = t.
Note that assertion checking is executed over renamed versions of the original program states,
while logic formulas are evaluated by using the original operators of R. Renaming is key to neatly
separate assertion checking from system computations and avoid interferences that might jeopardize
termination, confluence and/or coherence properties in the repaired program (for a detailed
discussion on renaming, see [1]).2 The second phase transforms the original rewrite rules of R into guarded, conditional rewrite rules
that can only be fired if no system assertion is violated. Intuitively, this is achieved by transforming
each rewrite rule r : (l → r if C) of R into a refined version r’: (l → r if C ^ ren(r) =/= fail) of r, which
contains the extra constraint ren(r) =/= fail that holds when the renamed apart instances of the
right-hand side r of the rule r cannot be simplified to fail by using the extended equational theory E
[ Eq(A).
This way, we ensure that any state transition from state s1 to state s2 is enabled in the program R’
only if s2 is a safe state, that is, every assertion of A holds in s2.
As an important advantage of the method, executability conditions of R and E are preserved by the
correction transformation. Furthermore, the methodology copes with infinite space states and does
not require the knowledge of any failing run. A rigorous and complete formalization of the method can
be found in [1].
A typical correction transformation session
To show how our correction methodology works in practice, we consider a topmost Maude
program RD that specifies a simple dam controller for monitoring and managing the water volume of a
basin. The workflow of the correction methodology is depicted in Fig. 2.
In the sequel, variable names are fully capitalized. We assume that the dam model is provided with
a spillway called s which has three possible aperture widths of increasing discharge capacity c, o1, o2.
A spillway configuration is formally specified by a term [s,O], where O belongs to the set {c,o1,o2}.
System states are defined by terms of the form
where SC is a spillway configuration, V is a rational number that indicates the basinwater volume (in m3),
T is a natural number that timestamps the current configuration, and AC (aperture command) is a Boolean
flag that enables changes of the spillway aperture widths only when its value is true.3 Note that, in the case of mixfix operators, we just rename one operator symbol. For instance, the binary, mixfix operator < _ |
> would be renamed < _ | _ >’.
Fig. 2. Correction workflow.
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outflow depends on the aperture width of the current spillway configuration. Basin inflow and outflow
are measured in m3/min and are specified by the following Maude equations
Note that more realistic scenarios could be easily defined by specifying more sophisticated basin
inflow and outflow functions.
The dam controller dynamics is modeled by the following eight rewrite rules, which implement
system state transitions.
The openX-Y rewrite rules progressively increment the aperture width of the spillway s (e.g., the
rule open1-2 increases the aperture of the spillway s from level open1 to level open2). Dually, closeX-Y
rewrite rules progressively decrease the aperture width of a spillway. The rule nocmd specifies the
empty command, which basically states that no action is taken on the spillway configuration by
the dam controller at time instant T. The rule is fired only when the AC flag is enabled, and its
application disables the flag to allow a new basin water volume to be computed in the next time
instant. These rules implement instantaneous spillway modifications that do not change the time
instant or the basin water volume.
The temporal evolution of the basin water volume is specified by the conditional rewrite rule
volume that computes the volume W at time T + deltaT, given the input volume V at time T. The
parameter deltaT is measured in minutes and can be set by the user. The volume computation changes
the input volume V by adding the water inflow and subtracting the corresponding water outflow over
the deltaT interval.
The use of the AC flag in the rule definitions guarantees a fair interleaving between the applications
of the rule volume and the remaining rewrite rules. Specifically, this implies that a new basin water
volume is computed after each spillway aperture width modification.
Note that computations in RD may reach potentially hazardous system states (e.g., an extremely
high water volume), since RD does not implement any spillway management policy that safely
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enforced is specified in order to apply our correction transformation:
Roughly speaking, assertion a1 states that, in every system state, the basin water volume must be
less than 50 million m3 to avoid dam bursts and potentially disastrous floods. Assertion a2 specifies
that, whenever the basin water volume is greater than 40 million m3, the spillway must be fully open
(i.e., aperture width o2). Assertion a3 requires the complete closure of the spillway when the basin
water volume is particularly low (10 million m3).
The first phase of our correction method generates the equational theory Eq(AD) that includes the
following encodings of the assertions in AD.Fig. 3. Fixed dam controller R’D.
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corresponding assertion is violated.
The second phase transforms each rewrite rule of RD into their refined conditional counterpart as
follows:
By using the refined rules above, any state transition from a state s1 to a state s2 occurs only when s2
does not violate the assertions in AD, thereby enforcing a safe behavior of the corrected dam controller.
Method implementation and validation
The correction methodology has been implemented in the ATAME system that is available at http://
safe-tools.dsic.upv.es/atame. We conducted a thorough experimental evaluation using ATAME that
demonstrates good performance (regarding code size, execution time, and program transformation
time) for a number of benchmarks that are available and fully described within the ATAME web
platform and in [1]. As shown in [1], transformation times are almost negligible, and moreover,
running the corrected program R' in Maude is more than 50% faster on average than running the
original program R in a monitored environment that implements runtime assertion checking.
Maude programs can be either uploaded to ATAME as simple “.maude” files or written from scratch.
Once the intended assertions have been also introduced inside a dedicated edit box, the correction
procedure can be executed by simply clicking the “Fix Program” button, which delivers a coerced
version of the program whose computations respect all the imposed assertions. Fig. 3 shows a
fragment of the dam controller R’D that has been automatically fixed by ATAME.
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